A Thought on the Parasha
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Shoftim
The recent
news of an alternative conversion court in Israel headed by some of the most
prominent religious-Zionist rabbis - Rabbi Nahum Rabinowitz, Rabbi Yaakov
Medan, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin, and Rabbi David Stav - represents a major step
toward breaking the Chief Rabbinate's monopoly over matters of personal status
in Israel. This is a truly exciting development. Not only will thousands
of people who have been denied the opportunity to convert now be able to become
Jews in full accordance with halakha, the move also signals a hopeful
new era of less centralized institutional rabbinic power in
Israel. Greater decentralization means greater diversity and an increase
in options (a reality that reflects the true nature of our multi-vocal halakhic
system), and have more options and more voices results in more competition,
more checks and balances, and - we can only hope - less corruption.
The issue of a
high court and centralized rabbinic (or at least judicial) power is a major
theme in this week's parasha. In addition to commanding the appointment
of judges and officers of the law throughout the land, the Torah also sets up a
High Court and takes serious measures to protect its authority. We are told
that when a matter cannot be resolved otherwise, the issue should be taken to
the place that God has chosen - Jerusalem - and brought before the
"priests and the judge who will be at that time" (Devarim,
17:9). This body, understood to be the Sanhedrin or High Court, will issue
a ruling which must be followed without deviation. Dissent is not tolerated:
"And the person who acts presumptuously, and will not listen to the priest
who stands there to serve before the Lord thy God, or unto the judge, that man
shall die, and you shall eradicate the evil from Israel" (17:12). The
court will act harshly and decisively to stamp out any threat to its authority.
We can
understand the need to protect the court's role as the highest authority
empowered to interpret the law. If people could interpret and apply the law as
they saw fit, general lawlessness would ensue. Nevertheless, it is hard to
identify with the harshness of the response - the death penalty! - for any
deviation. Moreover, such squelching of opposing and critical voices would seem
to give the court absolute, unchecked power. What, then, is to stop absolute
power from corrupting absolutely?
As far as the
death penalty is concerned, the Rabbis significantly limited its scope. While
making it clear that the duty to follow the rulings of the court is incumbent
upon everyone, the Rabbis said that the death penalty of the verses is reserved
for the zaken mamre, the rebellious elder. Only a great sage, a
great legal scholar, can receive such a punishment. If he acts in opposition to
the court and, the Rabbis add, rules for others in this manner, then he has
positioned himself as a competing legal authority. Theoretical debate is fine,
but to rule in practice against the court is not. This can truly undermine the
authority of the court, and it must be stopped. The Rabbis impose many more
criteria for one to be considered a zaken mamre, effectively making this
category moot. With the death penalty effectively removed, how can the court's
authority be defended against real opposition?
We are told in
a well-known story that Rabbi Eliezer ruled that a certain oven was ritually
pure while all other rabbis ruled that it was impure. Rabbi Eliezer cited
miraculous signs showing that he was correct: a carob tree was uprooted, a
stream of water flowed backwards, and the walls of the study house bent in. The
punch line comes when the rabbis say to God: "The Torah is not in Heaven!
It is for us to decide!" In this audacious story, the authority of the
court is so great that it trumps even God's own claim as to the true meaning of
the Torah! But the story doesn't end there, for the court's authority has been
challenged not only by God, who in the story chuckles and steps back, but also
by a great rabbinic sage, someone who is not willing to step down and go
quietly, someone who acts in highly public and demonstrative ways to prove that
he is right. This, the story tells us, is a serious threat.
Perhaps the
carob, the stream, and the walls of the study house represent the societal
structures and the natural order of things. Taken this way, Rabbi Eliezer's
insistence on his position against the court can be interpreted as an attempt
to reverse the natural order, an act that could shake the foundations of
society. And it must be stopped: "On that day, all that objects that R.
Eliezer had declared to be ritually clean were brought in and burnt by
fire" (Baba Mezia 59b). Without violence and without putting anyone to
death, the rabbis demonstrated, firmly and decisively, that challenges to its
authority would not and could not be tolerated. But with such absolute
authority, who is to keep the court honest? What checks and balances exist over
it? For this, we return to the beginning of the parasha: the appointment
of judges.
In the United
States, the ability of other branches of government to appoint and approve
justices and to create lower courts serves as a check to the power of the
Supreme Court. This echoes the Torah's mandate that the people appoint the
judges and create regional courts: "Judges and officers you shall appoint
in all your gates [meaning cities] and all your tribes" (16:18). Regional
courts distribute the power; it is not completely in the hands of the High
Court. With only a very few cases reaching the High Court for adjudication,
almost all the interpretation and application of law is done by the regional
courts. In effect, the court system is rather decentralized. Every court makes
decisions for the constituents under its jurisdiction, but its decisions must
also be recognized by the courts of other jurisdictions if it is to maintain
its authority (Rav Moshe Feinstein provides a nice discussion of this in his
Dibrot Moshe, Shabbat, 10.2).
In addition to
this structural decentralization there is a mandate that the court work to
protect the rights of the marginal and disempowered in society as it represents
the majority: "You shall not pervert judgment; you shall not respect
persons....Justice, only justice, you shall pursue" (16:19-20). Judges
must protect themselves against outside influences accordingly: "You may
not take a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and corrupts the
words of the righteous" (16:19). According to the Rabbis, this applies
even if it the bribe is intended to guarantee correct judgment.
While these
are powerful mandates, there is no body to ensure that they are being followed.
The court must be its own watchdog. If the judges are found in violation, they
can be disqualified with a type of impeachment. Short of that, their own
integrity must keep them in check. It is for this reason that, in Yitro's
advice to Moshe, the Torah describes the need for high personal character in
the judges. This and only this will keep them honest. But such men are hard to
find and, once found, can still be corrupted by power. A story is told that
when Rav Maimon, the first Minister of Religion in Israel, was looking to
reestablish the Sanhedrin he was asked by Ben Gurion, "But where will you
find people who are sonei batzah [Shemot, 18:21], despisers of
unearned gain?" Rav Maimon responded, "With enough money you can get
anything, even sonei batzah."
It is clear
that a lot rides on the appointment of judges: who is chosen, who does the
choosing, who they represent, and the strength of their personal character and
integrity. Outside Israel, halakhic authority is distributed
and adherence to it is volitional (as a matter of secular law). By nature,
rabbis and the batei din have to be more responsive to those
who would come to them. In Israel, however, we have rabbinical courts with real
concentrated authority. Until now their authority has been even more
centralized than the system described in our parasha. Recent events give us
hope that a more decentralized system will continue to develop and take
hold. But whether highly centralized or less so, true justice requires the
right judges. If we are to have rabbinic bodies with real power, then it is
incumbent upon us to make sure that as a society we are living up to our
parasha's mandate to ensure that the judges we appoint truly embody
"justice, only justice" for the people whom they serve. With this we
will be deserving to merit the blessing of Devarim, 16:20: "So that you
will live and possess the land which the Lord your God gives you," for as
Rashi tells us, "the appointment of fit and proper judges is worthy of
giving life to the Jewish People and to cause them to dwell in their
land."
Shabbat Shalom!
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